This paper outlines the notion of 'algorithmic technique' as a middle ground between concrete, implemented algorithms and the broader study and theorization of software. Algorithmic techniques specify principles and methods for doing things in the medium of software and they thus constitute units of knowledge and expertise in the domain of software making. I suggest that algorithmic techniques are a suitable object of study for the humanities and social science since they capture the central technical principles behind actual software, but can generally be described in accessible language. To make my case, I focus on the field of information ordering and, first, discuss the wider historical trajectory of formal or 'mechanical' reasoning applied to matters of commerce and government before, second, moving to the investigation of a particular algorithmic technique, the Bayes classifier. This technique is explicated through a reading of the original work of M. E. Maron in the early 1960 and presented as a means to subject empirical, 'datafied' reality to an interested reading that confers meaning to each variable in relation to an operational goal. After a discussion of the Bayes classifier in relation to the question of power, the paper concludes by coming back to its initial motive and argues for increased attention to algorithmic techniques in the study of software.
Introduction
Since the popularization of the Internet, algorithmic procedures for information retrieval, ordering, and filtering have increasingly come into the focus of scholars in the humanities and social sciences. Search engines have been the most noticeable example. Their immense popularity has made the discussion of ranking procedures relevant to wider audiences, and the established field of web search studies (Zimmer, 2010) indicates continuing academic interest. The web also provides many other instances where algorithms select, hierarchize, suggest, and so forth: online sellers make automated product 'recommendations', dating sites calculate 'compatibility' coefficients between members and arrange them accordingly, news aggregators generate front pages according to measures of 'noteworthiness', social networking services filter friends' status updates based on 'closeness' metrics, and microblogging services give prominence to 'trending' topics based on sudden spikes in activity. The terms between quotation marks highlight that we are dealing with cultural and thus highly ambiguous tasks being expressed as and delegated to mechanical procedures. A popular book by Eli Pariser (2011) lists many more cases of 'algorithmic sorting ' (p. 72) and argues that the tendency to personalize information runs the risk of enclosing us in 'filter bubbles' that restrict us to 'information that conforms to our ideas of the world' (p. 52). While Pariser's take on the phenomenon is limited in terms of evidence, the book has the merit of having introduced a broad audience to a phenomenon that is undeniably real and arguably significant: algorithmic proceduresand the larger configurations they are embedded inhave indeed started to '[transform] the world we experience by controlling what we see and don't see ' (p. 48) .
There remains a stark contrast, however, between the increasingly accepted diagnosis that '[s]oftware structures and makes possible much of the contemporary world' (Fuller, 2008, p. 1) and the attention given to specific instances and precise methods. If software has indeed become a technique of power or, more accurately, a medium for designing and deploying complex techniques for 'conducting conduct' (Foucault, 2004a, p. 192) , it is disconcerting that the critical analysis of concrete technical objects, procedures, and practices is exceedingly rare. Much like Pariser, scholars in the humanities and social sciences often prefer theorizing the social and political effects of software to the examination of the technical logics and arrangements that produce algorithmic enunciations in the first place. While software studies and related fields have begun to take up this work, there has been a focus on algorithmic language, code, rather than algorithmic literature, the programs designed and written in concrete settings with concrete goals in mind. While understanding the former is crucial, the actual landscape of existing software does not follow teleologically from the mere existence of computing machinery and programming languages. Software, like language, allow for the expression and mechanization of a wide range of ideas and objectives, even if basic principles and historically accumulated knowledge and convention structure possibilities and actual outcomes.
Some of the most promising efforts to 'study the algorithm' (Lazer, Kennedy, King, & Vespignani, 2014 , p. 1205 have come from journalists adapting their 'traditional watchdogging [to] algorithmic accountability reporting' (Diakopoulos, 2015, p. 398) , using reverse engineering techniques to reconstruct decision procedures. Emerging research methods for auditing algorithms point in a similar direction (cf. Custers, Calders, Schermer, & Zarsky, 2013; Sandvig, Hamilton, Karahalios, & Langbort, 2014; Sweeney, 2013) . But there are limits to what one is able to infer from the outside, since information systems are often both complex and adaptive by design. These systems, however, do not sprout from an intellectual vacuum. Starting from the observation that the design of algorithmic procedures draws on rich reservoirs of knowledge made available by disciplines such as computer science and software engineering, this paper formulates an approach to the analysis of software that sits between broad theorizing and the empirical investigation of concrete applications of information ordering algorithms. This middle ground revolves around the finite set of well-known approaches to information filtering and classification that underpin most running systems. These standardized yet plastic methods, which I propose to call algorithmic techniques, are at the core of both software development practice and computer science education. In fact, learning how to program, in the sense of mastering a programming language, makes for only a small part of computer science education at the university level. A much larger portion is concerned with the many different and often math-heavy techniques that can be expressed in code and with how to apply them to the notorious 'real-world problems' students are set to encounter in concrete work settings. Algorithmic techniques are, in that sense, units of knowledge and expertise in the domain of software making. What Wing (2006) and others have called 'computational thinking' is precisely this: the capacity to abstract from a concrete situation to a level where familiar algorithmic techniques can be applied. This brings software specialists 1 in line with other methods experts, such as statisticians, operational researchers, or consultants, who master a set of methods and procedures they readily apply to diverse situations.
While algorithmic techniques are ultimately destined for implementation in software, they often begin with ideas that have little to do with computation. For example, there is nothing intrinsically computational about the inkling that spam messages can be identified by inspecting their textual content. But Graham's (2002) proposal to use a statistical classifier that treats every single word in a message as an indicator for 'spamminess' moves the initial intuition firmly into computational territory, even if actual programs may enact the idea in a variety of ways. The term 'statistical classifier', however, points not only to the larger space of probability theory, but also to a list of well-documented algorithmic techniques for performing statistical classification. Each technique revolves around a central idea, a conceptual core that is normally laid out in a combination of natural language and mathematical notation. The technique provides a general rationale and formal calculative specifications, but implementing these elements in a working system still requires many decisions to be made concerning the units to take into account, the parameters to specify, the tweaks to apply, the outputs to produce, and so forth. I would argue that the most concrete manifestation of cumulative knowledge in computer science and related disciplines is an ever-growing archive of techniques, ready to hand for those skilled to apply them. Code, then, is the medium to express these techniques in terms a computer can understand, and concrete algorithms are the outcome of situated encounters between computing environments, algorithmic techniques, and local requirements. I believe that the critical investigation of software and the various social roles it plays could greatly benefit from a deeper understanding of algorithmic techniques. To develop this argument in more detail, I propose to investigate a particular example from the field of information ordering.
The mention of spam filtering already points to the technique I will examine more closely in this paper since Bayes classifiers are commonly used for this task. Bayes classifiers are also often referred to as Bayesian filters, pointing to the observation that tasks like search, classification, and filtering are closely related from a technical perspective (cf., Belkin & Croft, 1992) . I therefore use the term 'information ordering' to address these practices on the whole. Bayes classifiers provide a specific method for making use of statistical inference to sort a new element, for example, an incoming email, on the basis of a decision model derived from previously categorized elements, for example, messages already marked as spam. There are three main reasons for choosing this particular technique. First, Bayes classifiers are an instructive pars pro toto for contemporary information ordering. Since they are probabilistic (their classifications are not binary but with degrees of certainty), adaptive (they 'learn' from experience), and well suited for personalization, they allow for a discussion of aspects central to the wider field of machine learning. Second, the principles Bayes classifiers rely on are sufficiently simple to be laid out in ways that do not require familiarity with probability mathematics. Third, Bayes filters are caught up in a historical nexusearly information retrieval and text miningthat is both closely related to politically relevant applications in the present and instructive for the larger theoretical argument I want to make. While Bayes classifiers are only one of many techniques applicable to the tasks that prompt us to question the social power of algorithms in the first place, such as content filtering or recommendation and automated assessment of creditworthiness or job qualification, they represent instances of the interested reading of empirical, 'datafied' 2 reality that runs through these examples.
Tackling the question of the social power of algorithms through the critical examination of a particular technique implies a significant deviation from more common approaches that either discuss 'algorithms' as such, generalizing over the vast diversity of existing techniques, or examine a specific application domain (e.g., content filtering or credit scoring) or platform (e.g., Facebook) where algorithms perform crucial roles. The approach developed in this paper, however, aligns with the specific way algorithmic techniques are diverse and general at the same time: while every technique implies a particular way of doing things, they can often be applied to a wide array of domains if some basic requirements are met. As I will lay out in more detail below, these requirements can be quite general: for the application of a Bayes classifier, for example, one merely needs to squeeze the entities to classify into the form of objects that have some quantified properties and decide on a feedback or 'supervision' mechanism to train the statistical model. Besides emails, this can mean almost anything, including people, situations, and ideas.
When it comes to assessing the political significance of what was long called 'computerization', a beautifully unadorned term to capture the digital overhaul so many practices have become subjected to, there are basically three ideal-typical positions to take. The first considers that computers, software, and the experts accompanying them follow a singular logic, for example, that of instrumental reason. If that logic is found lacking, the political struggle revolves around the containment or reversal of computerization. This attitude manifests in the work of thinkers like Heidegger and Illich, or, more recently, in Golumbia's (2009) study of 'computationalism'. The second position sees technology merely as an epiphenomenon of social or economic forces, which means that studying these forces themselves would tell us all we need to know. Neither social constructivism at the micro level nor Marxist criticism at the macro level would see a particular need to study algorithmic techniques in any detail since they are consequences and not causes. While technology can become relevant through reification or productivity enhancement, the real sites of struggle are elsewhere. A third position, however, holds that computing technology can have considerable political significance without necessarily encapsulating a singular logic. This means that different forms of computerization are conceivable. Computers and software, here, are certainly considered to entail their own 'substance', even if their specificity lies not in a singular ideological imprint, but in the particular ways they represent and intervene in the world. This stance can be found in fields such as the 'values in design' movement (Nissenbaum, 2005) or in Philip Agre's work (Agre, 1997) , and it implies reform and critical participation. If one espouses one of the first two positions, there is little reason to examine particular techniques in any detail since all they can ever be is the mere expression of broad logics or ideologies. For the third position, however, examining techniques matters, because it leads to an understanding of not only what they actually do and how they do it, but also what they could do or could do differently. If software is seen as a genuine form of cultural expression and intervention, the conceptual horizon mobilized in technical artifacts is a relevant object of study for the humanities and social sciences as well as a site for political assertion and struggle. This paper emphatically embraces the third position, but strives to remain sensitive to the arguments put forward by the other two. Despite my short and reductive presentation, we should discount neither the homogenizing effects of computational principles, ideas, and conventions, nor their deep entanglement with larger social and economic configurations. The margins of choice the third position emphasizes are not simply there, but need to be created, identified, articulated, and defended. In this spirit, I use the Bayes classifier example both as my case and to make my case.
Discussing a technique that produces a decision model based on the encounter between data and feedback, however, requires a broader introduction. When editors Joseph Becker and Robert M. Hayes (1963) inaugurated the Information Sciences Series, an influential book series published by Wiley & Sons from 1963 on, with the statement that '[i]nformation is the essential ingredient in decision making' (p. V), they explicitly tied the nascent discipline to the goal-driven pragmatism of management and operations research rather than to the scientific ideal of disinterested analysis and description. This points to a tradition of applying formal or 'mechanical' reasoning to matters of commerce and government that shares little with Leibniz' famed algebra of thought and the pure universalism of mathematical logic that is often emphasized in histories of computing. But the application of calculation to practical matters and, in particular, to the management of increasing organizational size and complexity (Beniger, 1986 ) has a long history that culminates in the emergence of statistics as the predominant way to look at and act in a world seen as dynamic and opaque.
Statistics and accounting realism
While the interface between calculation and reasoning has been amply studied through the history of the 'noble' field of logic, it was in the murky arenas of commerce and government that computation became an applied technique for practical decision-making. The advent of double-entry bookkeeping in the fifteenth century and the circulation of algorismimanuals for learning applied arithmeticboth responded to and enabled growth in long-distance trade, where bigger ships and longer routes demanded larger organizational entities that, in turn, required means to manage complex logistics and the sharing of risk and profit. This 'elevated computation to the status of an empirical science' (Swetz, 1987, p. 295 ) that provided robust tools to control and decide, thereby stabilizing, standardizing, and systematizing how merchants managed their businesses and interacted with their peers. Uncertainty was not eliminated, but quantified as risk, calling for insurance rather than avoidance. William Petty's Political Arithmetik (1655) is notable for applying these commercial techniques to matters of government, leading to concrete recommendations concerning public investment and economic organization based on what we would today call cost-benefit analysis. Statistics, as the name indicates, is deeply intertwined with such attempts to develop a 'science of the state', a rational means to govern, manage, and decide.
Up to this day, the term statistics has kept a double meaning. On the one side, it refers to the collection of facts or data, which, in the nineteenth century, turned into an 'avalanche' (Hacking, 1990, p. 2) or 'deluge' (Cohen, 2005, p. 113 ) of tabulated numbers concerning many different subjects. This type of 'description by numbers' is what we mean when we talk about accident or employment statistics. On the other side, '[b]y 1889, users of statistics [ … ] had become discontent with the mere presentation of numerical facts, and were looking for more refined methods of analysis' (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 58) , which led to the emergence of a series of mathematical techniques used to analyze and find patterns in collected data, for example, dependencies between variables. Both meanings refer to epistemic practices, that is, practices caught up in the production and definition of knowledge, but the latter indeed mobilizes mechanical reasoning in its fullest sense, as a purely formal transformation of one set of symbols into another that produces nonetheless an epistemic surplus in the process. The detection of a significant level of correlation between two variables is not simply a 'presentation of numerical fact'; it is a cognitive operation that generates an interpretation of the relationship between numbers and, by extension, the world they purport to describe.
At the same time, statistics is tied to a particular class of problems or, rather, of 'problematizations', the specific ways things are brought forward and framed as problems (Foucault, 1984, p. 17f) . As a subfield of mathematics, statistics provides techniques for reasoning in situations where large numbers of entities behave in ways that can no longer be accounted for by modeling a single unit. Statistical mechanics, for example, materialized when it became clear that a description of the empirical behavior of gases based on the measurement of individual molecules would be utterly impossible. Similarly, as Foucault (2004b, p. 107f ) points out, the study of epidemics and economic dynamics in the nineteenth century undermined the dominance of the family as a model for understanding and governing society. Instead, the population emerged as a proper conceptual entity, seen as giving rise to phenomena and dynamics that could not be reduced to its constituent parts. Both molecules and people could no longer be described in deterministic terms when encountered as 'living multiples' (Mackenzie & McNally, 2013) . In both cases, statistics would resolve the supposed contradiction between uncertainty and control (Hacking, 1990) by providing the concepts and techniques to reason with and about multiples. The structure and dynamics of sets of similar but shifting entities or cases become, at the same time, explanandum and explanans. Statistics recognizes the problem of multiples as a defining characteristic of the world and develops notions such as regularity and variation, distribution and tendency, or dependence and correlation to examine, describe, and act on it.
Whether we fully accept the validity and utility of statistics' concepts and tools is secondary here; what counts is that 'in the operations of government, the conduct of business and finance, the activities of science and engineering, and even in some aspects of daily life' (Cohen, 2005, p. 17) , statistical reasoning has become, long before the advent of computers, an accepted and 'trusted' (Porter, 1995) form of relating to the world, in terms of both understanding (interpretation) and intervention (decision-making). But as Desrosières (2001) notes, statistics permit different 'attitudes' towards the 'reality' they are meant to describe, different 'orchestrations of reality ' (p. 346) . 'Metrological realism' (p. 340), the correspondence or equivalence theory of truth, is but one of them. What we find in commerce and government, where statistics have come to play an even larger role than in science, is 'accounting realism', where the '"equivalence space" is composed not of physical quantities (space and time), but of a general equivalent: money' (p. 342). Here, the benchmark for the validity of a technique is no longer disinterested correspondence, but its usefulness for attaining specific goals.
Unsurprisingly, early Information Science turns mainly to statistics to solve its own problem of multiples and largely subscribes to the pragmatism of accounting realism. Not only Bush's (1945) famous paper laments the 'growing mountain of research' (p. 112) bogging down scientists; in the 1950s and 1960s, when many of the techniques and algorithms used to order information today were first laid out, there were few publications that did not invoke the growing mass and increased the speed of production of written information. In the process of developing mechanical approaches to solve this problem, knowledge, long understood as a coherent and consistent whole that needed to be mapped by enlightened individuals, came to be redefined as a complex, dynamic, and sprawling mass of documents that needed to be processed and 'mined' in relation to a specific, situated requirement. This meant a far-reaching investment in knowledge's computable substitute, information, and the development of 'information retrieval' (Mooers, 1950) as a set of methods for making decisions about documents.
A statistical approach to computing meaning Interestingly, information retrieval employs the deeply ambiguous term 'information' first in its everyday meaning as akin to 'stored knowledge'. Unlike Shannon's Theory of Communication, which was concerned with the technical aspects of signal transmission, the nascent information sciences targeted what Weaver called the 'level B' of communication, that is, 'the semantic problem' (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 4) , that is, meaning. Often referred to in less intimidating terms such as 'aboutness' or 'relevance', handling meaning through information ordering became the central focus, even if this initially meant little more than selecting and ranking documents in relation to a query or 'question'. But the field evolved at a rapid pace. If we divide contemporary methods for information filtering into two rough groups, content-based filtering using properties of documents to decide what to do with them and collaborative filtering relying on social 'recommendation', a considerable part of the first group was essentially in place by 1975 3 and one could argue that the second group is at least partially anticipated by work in citation analysis dating back to the 1960s.
Content-based filtering, the field where Bayes classifiers where first developed, uses text words, sentences, paragraphs, etc.as a stand-in for meaning, as a raw material from which to infer 'aboutness' by means of computation. This effort relied on the realization, attributed to Alonzo Church and Alan Turing, 'that numbers were an inessential aspect of computationthey were just one way of interpreting the internal states of the machine' (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, p. 4) , which meant that the 'digital handling of non-numerical information' (Mooers, 1950 ) became a plausible endeavor. Like its more illustrious cousin, artificial intelligence, information retrieval set out to extend the scope of mechanical reasoning to a domain previously considered a human privilege: the handling of knowledge. Rather than reconstruct the overall history of information retrieval any further, this section sets out to investigate a particular way this was envisioned concretely.
The Bayes classifier indeed epitomizes the application of statistics to Information Science's mission to process meaning and knowledge. The story begins in the late 1950s when M. E. Maron, 4 an analytical philosopher and cybernetician working at the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation and the (infamous) Rand Corporation before becoming a full professor at Berkeley's School of Information in 1966, 'was thinking hard about the problem of information retrieval' (Maron, 2008, p. 971) . He was particularly unsatisfied with the practice of indexing documents, where assigning a tag to an item in order to describe its subject was 'a two-valued affair' (p. 971): a term was either attributed or not, nothing in between. The first improvement Maron, in collaboration with colleague J. L. Kuhns, proposed was for indexers to specify a value, somewhere between 0 and 1, to indicate a tag's relevance for a document. This method, named probabilistic indexing, made it possible, through inverse statistical inference via Bayes' theorem, to provide an automatically ranked result list for a subject query instead of merely an unordered set of documents (Maron & Kuhns, 1960) .
Leaving aside its complicated history and various interpretations, Bayes' theorem basically provides a simple method to calculate the probability of a hypothesis based on existing knowledge. For example, if we know the percentage of women in a population and the a priori percentages of women and men with long hair, we can calculate the probability of the hypothesis that a person with long hair we see only from behind is a woman. In our case, the hypothesis concerns the probability that a document (tagged with a number of weighted terms) is relevant for a query (represented by a number of search terms that could also be weighted). Interestingly, Maron proposed from the outset to replace the a priori probability of a document (the equivalent of the 'percentage of women in a population'), which would normally be one divided by the number of documents in the collection, with statistics on document use. This choice introduces the much discussed principle of cumulative advantage or 'Matthew effect' (Merton, 1968) into the process, since documents with greater use will end up higher on the result list, in turn leading to even higher use. In the end, Maron's formula for relevance looked like this, using a dot product 5 to calculate the 'closeness' between query terms ('WordsQuery') and the document terms ('WordsDoc'): P(DocumentIsRelevant) = (WordsQuery · WordsDoc) * P(DocumentUse).
(1)
When searching for [hydraulics], a document tagged with 0.7 for that term would thus have a higher 'relevance number' than a document tagged with a value of 0.5. Documents accessed more often also received a higher value. Results were then ranked according to their relevance number. Term combinations and weighted search terms were possible as well. The method was still based on manual indexing, but represented nonetheless 'a theoretical attack which replaced traditional two-valued indexing and matching with a statistical approach […] to make predictions about the relevance of documents in the collection' (Thompson, 2008, p. 964) .
The indexing and ranking technique I just outlined is not a Bayes classifier, however. It introduced Bayes' theorem into information retrieval, but it was a second experiment that went further and attempted to do away with the human indexerwho was regarded by early information scientists as slow, unreliable, and biasedby using the full text of the document itself. Based on the assertion that 'statistics on kind, frequency, location, order, etc., of selected words are adequate to make reasonably good predictions about the subject matter of documents containing those words' (Maron, 1961, p. 405 ), Maron devised a technique for the automatic classification of documents: the Bayes classifier.
Classification, in terms of the probabilistic approach proposed by Maron, meant that text documents were to be sorted into user-specified subject categories: '[b]ased on some more or less clear notion of the category, we must decide whether or not an arbitrary document should be assigned to it' (Maron, 1961, p. 404) . A simple contemporary example is indeed spam filtering: emails are documents and categories are spam and not-spam. Maron's technique conceived text documents as objects having certain properties (or features), which simply means that each text was represented by the finite list of words it contained as well as their frequency. These properties were considered to say at least something about the subject matter the document discussesgood enough for the pragmatic task of information retrieval. Today, such lists of quantified properties are generally referred to as vectors or feature vectors.
The first step was then to select a number of characteristic 'training' documents for each one of the subject categorieshuman intervention was thus rearranged, not eliminatedand to generate a combined word list for each category from the selected documents. Not all words were considered. Very frequent words and very rare words were discarded. The resulting selection was submitted to a technique similar in spirit to the now very common term frequencyinverse document frequency (tf*idf) metric introduced by Karen Spärck Jones (1972) in the early 1970s: words that are evenly distributed over all categories are considered inadequate 'clues' and thus rejected. For the words having sufficient 'specificity', an index was generated, where each word was attributed a relevance value for each category, determining 'certain probability relationships between individual content-bearing words and subject categories' (Maron, 1961, p. 405) . In a nutshell: if a word appears very often in the training documents assigned to a certain category, but is rare for others, it becomes a strong clue or indicator for that category.
Once the training phase was complete, human intervention was no longer required: based on the general idea that a document should be attributed to a category if it contains many good indicators for it, new documents could be automatically classified. The calculative procedure was very similar to the ranking procedure outlined above, but instead of calculating the fit between query terms and document terms, the fit between the word list for a category and the word list for each incoming document was calculated. Since many words were taken into account, every document was likely to receive a relevance value for several categories, for example, document n is 0.8 relevant for category i, 0.5 for category j, and so forth, resulting in probabilistic rather than binary classification. The system was adaptive in the sense that it could allow for learning beyond the initial training: if a user decides to reclassify a document, the word lists for categories would be recalculated, adding the new 'knowledge' to the statistical model. This is the basic outline of a Bayes classifier and a surprisingly representative illustration of the larger field of contemporary machine learning techniques. Since the approach assumes statistical independence between words, it is more specifically called a 'naive' Bayes classifier, but almost all modern techniques such as maximum entropy classifiers or support vector machines use the same feature vectors as starting point, even if the mathematical procedures applied differ. There are a number of important aspects to consider.
First, the procedure I have just described is precisely what the term 'algorithmic technique' attempts to thematize. What I have just laid out in plain English is not yet an algorithm in a more restrictive understanding of the term, but it outlines a method for classification that entails a way of both looking at and acting in and on the world. It frames and formalizes text documents as word frequency lists, formulates a sequence of stages from training to classification to adjustment, and specifies a number of proto-mathematical functions for weighing and calculating. Any software developer would be able to create a working program from my description, but every implementation would be different since many details remain unspecified and require decisions. Should words be reduced to their stems? Where to cut off frequent and infrequent words? How to calculate word specificity? These and other questions need to be answered when an algorithmic technique is brought to bear on a specific task in a specific operating environment. A concrete algorithm is the outcome of that process. This means that the study of algorithmic techniques is not enough to make sense of actual systems, their behavior, and the many specific commitments they imply. But a robust understanding of common techniques can both ground more general forms of theorizing in the actual rationales underpinning software making and inform more concrete forms of empirical analysis. It can lay the ground work for comparison between different implementations by proving analytical categories for example, selected units and features, training and feedback setup, and decision modalitiesthat span these cases.
Second, the given example of text classification is but one application of a more general technique. Maron's work relies on a specific framing of texts as quantified lists of words, completely ignoring aspects such as order, syntax, or style. Meaning is thus conceived in a highly reductive manner and although systems using broader and deeper understandings of language both can and do exist, any running system requires and relies in some way on selection, formalization, and reduction. Datafication thereby translates fundamental assumptions about the application domain into data structures and reifies them. This more often than not implies not only reduction, but also reduction to a common form, a movement that underpins generalization and explains how techniques can be applied to a wide variety of domains. Bayes classifiers are applicable to all entities that can be represented as feature vectors, that is, lists of valued properties. Songs can be grouped based on which users listened to them 6 ; locations and situations can be classified based on the characteristics and behavior of associated populations; applicants for credit can be approved or denied based on their Facebook profiles. But in all of these cases, someone has to make decisions on what and how to formalize and then to specify classes and attribute a minimum number of elements to these classes for the filter to begin its work. Other classification techniques will involve a different dramaturgy of steps and actors, but their field of application is bound to be comparably wide. If we think of user interfaces, tracking techniques, andincreasinglysensors as devices that channel aspects of human practice into formal data structures, it is no wonder that many of the techniques pioneered in information retrieval from the 1950s on have seen a second spring with the popularization of the Internet. The more things we do with digital appliances involved, the greater the number of entities and phenomena that can be formalized as objects and properties in the way just described. The ensuing proliferation of problems involving large sets of entities in already computerized settings makes algorithmic solutions almost inevitable.
Third, a Bayes classifier arranges decision-making in a way that is profoundly different from the common framing of algorithms as formulas. Even in academic publications, the prevalent conception seems to imagine a group of developers enumerating variables to take into account and specifying how to couple and weigh them. The makers of Facebook, for example, would brood over the criteria for Newsfeed filtering, meticulously arranging metrics such as affinity between users, post engagement, and some function of time to produce a clear decision recipe that is guarded like a precious secret. But this conception is increasingly incomplete and outdated; techniques such as Bayes classifiers propose the means to derive decision models from the encounter between some data, a purpose, and a mechanism for feedback. In the case of Bayesian spam filtering, nobody has to manually compile a list of 'spammy' words and weigh them. What happens is that in a first step classes are defined on the basis of what the classification is supposed to achieve, its purpose; in our case the sorting of emails into spam and not-spam. When a user begins to mark messages, the list of weighted words is generated automatically, producing a basis for decision-making that is not a clear-cut formula, but an adaptive statistical model containing potentially hundreds of thousands of variables. When a payday lender uses Facebook data to decide whether an applicant is likely to pay back a loan, there is no need for a Bourdieusian sociologist who tags every possible profile element in terms of class membership. It is enough to have a number of profiles of users who have already paid back or defaulted on their loans to generate a model where every single profile item becomes an indicator for 'creditworthiness'. Facebook can develop its Newsfeed filtering engine in a very similar way, using something like 'time on site' or 'ad click probability' as a criterion to determine which visibility parameters are optimal for every user, individually. Instead of selecting and weighing variables manually, the classifier derivesor 'learns'optimal parameters from the relation between data (posts that have different properties), feedback (a user's engagement with these posts), and a purpose (increasing engagement further). The system is then able to execute the following command: 'show to the user the posts similar to those that previously led to high engagement'. The Bayes classifier is thus neither a static recipe for decision-making nor a theory engaged in ontological attribution; it is a method for making data signify in relation to a particular desire to distinguish; it is a device for the automated production of interested readings of empirical reality. Maron's goal was not to say anything deep about the relationship between text and meaning, but to design a system that produces 'good' results in the domain of its application. I thus use the term 'interested' to emphasize that the epistemic process is not just tainted by some unavowed bias, but fully designed around an explicit purpose that trumps any epistemological or ontological qualms one may have. Just as Desrosières' (2001) notion of accounting realism suggests, 'the goal is no longer truth, but performativitythat is, the best possible input/output equation' (Lyotard, 1984, p. 46) .
Fourth, the technique does not determine the performativity of the resulting algorithm. The Bayes classifier provides the capacity for making interested readings, but specifies neither the purpose nor the way a decision is connected back to the world. Facebook can decide to train its Newsfeed engine based on any criterion the company could come up with. Does this make Bayes classifiers 'neutral' tools? Mackenzie (2015) argues that 'as machine learning is generalized, the forms of value that circulate in the form of commodities alter' (p. 444), emphasizing that the different technical 'styles' of processing 'entail different kinds of value' (p. 436). Seen as interested readings of datafied reality, one could push even further and argue that data mining techniques embody forms of cognition, specific styles of perception that, on the one side, are non-anthropomorphic in the sense that they consist of procedures that can only be enacted by fast computing machinery, and, on the other side, are thoroughly entangled with operational arrangements. On the level of signification, data mining techniques attribute meaning to every variable in relation to a purpose; on the level of performativity, the move to increasingly integrated digital infrastructures means that every classificatory decision can be pushed back into the world instantly, showing a specific ad, hiding a specific post, refusing a loan to a specific applicant, setting the price of a product to a specific level, and so forth. No data point remains innocent. If we consider power to operate as a 'network of relations' (Foucault, 1975, p. 31) , we can appreciate how data mining delivers specific ways of establishing, organizing, and modulating relations between datafied entities in service of strategic goals. Even if Bayes classifiers do not determine how their results are used at the interface level and beyond, they stand for a new set of technologies that produce deeply 'interested' knowledge, use it to make decisions with concrete effects, and thereby introduce a 'microphysics' 7 that has the potential to profoundly affect how power operates.
Fifth, as already mentioned, Bayes filters are ideal for personalization and it should come as no surprise that the first attempt (Rich, 1983) to personalize information retrieval for individuals and not just user categories (novice, expert, etc.) relied on a probabilistic method close to the one just described. Although there is, again, no technical imperative to produce a separate statistical model for each user, information retrieval renounced, from the beginning, the universalist notions of order we find in most knowledge classification systems used in libraries or encyclopedias. Even early systems emphasized the query over the database and attempted to transfer as much expressivity as possible to users, generally imagined as scientists who know very well what they are looking for. Systems were not conceptualized as convenient access points to stable trees of knowledge, but as engines of order, capable of projecting latent structures present in the data in a myriad of ways. As the filter bubble debate shows, liberal societies in particular are marked by the tension between universalism and perspectivism, and the Internet has further exacerbated the issue by, on the one side, uniting unprecedented numbers of people in front of the very same interfaces and, on the other, making it possible to serve each person something different. Bayes classifiers, as an instance of a larger group of techniques, are at the very center of this conundrum.
Standing in for the wider category of information ordering techniques, Bayes classifiers entangle meaningand not just the meaning of textsin complex and often very direct ways with decision-making informed by specific objectives and purposes. In a sense, Bacon's famous distinction between is and ought disappears in a form of description that is built, from the ground up, on a prescriptive horizon. We no longer (only) decide based on what we know; we know based on the decision we have to make.
To close this paper, then, I want to come back to the beginning of the argument and argue why it is worthwhile to study algorithmic techniques in the first place.
Why study algorithmic techniques?
Our relationship with tools and machines has beenat least since the Industrial Revolutionhighly ambiguous. Hailed or derided, technology rarely leaves indifferent, at least until it fades into the fabric of everyday life. Particularly since World War II, humanities scholars have proposed their own assessment, often in rather pessimistic accounts. But in most cases, these accounts have not taken the form of engagement with concrete technical objects and procedures; at the same time, the supposed autonomy of technological development has been regularly lamented. But could it be that this autonomy is a consequence of the lack of engagement with technology as technology, that is, as a vast ensemble of objects, techniques, and practices that can only be squeezed into the concept of techne at the price of extreme reduction?
For Simondon (2014) , the technical object gains its objectal dimension, that is, its place in economic, social, and psychosocial relations, on the basis of its objective dimension, that is, its technical operation. Technology (la technique) is seen as one of the fundamental ways, next to religion, science, or art, in which human beings relate to the world: 'What resides in machines is human reality, human gesture, fixed and crystallized in structures that function' (Simondon, 1958, p. 12, author's translation) . It is as 'beings that function' (Simondon, 2014, p. 138 ) that machines acquire meaning and not merely through cultural embedding. The assessment of the social role a technical object plays must, therefore, start from its 'functional meaning' (p. 28),that is, from what it does and how it does it. Building on this ground, I would like to put forward four arguments in favor of a more extensive engagement with algorithmic techniques.
First, insufficient attention to technical aspects and technical knowledge increases the risk that critique engages a straw man rather than the actual thing. Winner's diagnosis that 'our standard conceptions of technology reveal disorientation that borders on dissociation from reality' (Winner, 1978, p. 8) rings true more than ever. I hope that the Bayes classifier example has made amply clear that contemporary techniques for ordering information, and thus the many entities information can stand for, are not simply transpositions or extensions of older principles of cataloguing and classification into the digital space, even if interfaces employ familiar metaphors. As I have tried to show, there is a certain continuity or resonance with earlier forms and applications of mechanical reasoning. Through statistics, '[p]robability theory has become the arbiter of practical rationality' (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 255) , but the computer has greatly enhanced its scope and sheer power. However, when it comes to understanding how software operates, misconceptions abound. We can still read that '[l]ogical rules allow for no substantive ambiguity; either a proposition follows or it does not' (Golumbia, 2009, p. 194) , although non-monotonic, many-valued, or probabilistic logics have been central to computer science from its beginning. Bayes classifiers are perfect examples for techniques that will answer the question whether a document belongs to a certain category not with a 'yes' or a 'no', but rather with '0.7'. While the truly continuous, itself cast in doubt by quantum theory, is indeed outside of the domain of (digital) computers, the 'gradable and fuzzy' (Golumbia, 2009, p. 21) has been expressible in computational terms for a long, long time. This is essential to the appreciation of the political dimension of software; when thinking about control through algorithms, we should rely less on Leibniz' calculating philosophers as a guiding metaphor, and more on Petty's cost-benefit analyses operating today through concepts such as probability, average, margin, distribution, correlation, order, threshold, variation, tendency, distance, equilibrium, and so forth. Google may be an advertising company first, but it is a statistics company second. In the end, whether politically relevant phenomena such as filter bubbles are an accurate diagnosis, a straw man, or simply a pleasant moral panic needs to be established. Technical description is a necessary step toward demystification.
Second, by looking at concrete technical artifactswhether they are techniques or concrete implementationsthe misleading opposition between objectivity and subjectivity and, in particular, the dichotomy between judgment and calculation can be addressed in a different light. The term 'qualculation' (Cochoy, 2002) is useful here, because even purely computational procedures rely on extensive work that is not calculative. Maron's decision to formalize texts as word frequencies was designed to enable computation, not a result of computation. Callon and Law's (2005) argument that the notion of calculation should not be contrasted with (human) judgment, but rather extended to include it fully applies. This does not mean that all forms of reasoning are equivalent. One can safely say that Dean Baquet, executive editor of the New York Times, and Krishna Bharat, creator of the automated news aggregator Google News, both hold considerable influence over the news people read every day; but their 'power' is configured quite differently, operating through different techniques and mechanisms. Following Callon and Law, we can describe both configurations as qualculative in the sense that in both cases the decisions leading to actual outcomes combine elements of calculationeven the New York Times does not ignore its sales figuresand judgment. The differences in how they qualculate are significant, however. As previously noted, mechanical reasoning does not eliminate power, but reconfigures it and shifts human discretion from the definition of outcomes to the definition of procedures, mechanisms, or techniques that produce outcomes. The difference between The New York Times and Google News is important, but it cannot be reduced to the difference between judgment and calculation. Looking at Bayes classifiers, we see that moments of choice abound: the selection of training documents, the elimination of words, the setting of thresholds and cut-off points, the commitment to a rote theory of language that takes word frequencies as indicators of meaning, the various ways of coordinating between the classifier and the interface, and the choice to use a probabilistic method and this probabilistic method in the first place. Paradoxically, it seems that the more we calculate, the more judgment is required. This change in perspective should prompt us to trade the stale question whether algorithms are 'objective' or not for an investigation into the interpretative commitments, purposes, and benchmarks specific calculative assemblages subscribe to. The study of algorithmic techniques cannot replace the empirical analysis of the concrete sites and implementations where these decisions are ultimately made, but it can go far in informing such an endeavor.
Third, it is becoming increasingly clear that algorithmsoften based on probability techniquesare playing a crucial role in deciding how information circulates, how people find and relate to each other, and how conduct is indeed conducted. And while nearly every technique leaves room for many decisions and can be developed into various directions, its conceptual horizon still implies an epistemological orientation and specific forms of intervention. A critique needs to understand the paradoxical relationship between standardization and variation that characterizes software more often than not. Despite my emphasis of the 'purpose' or performance criterion above, the technicity of the Bayes classifier is not dissolved in its finality; rather, it presents a specific way to read and act on the world in relation to a specific purpose. A wider theory of Bayes classifiers, and, in extension, of machine learning, is both possible and desirable. Desrosières' (2001, p. 342 ) argument that accounting realism installs money as general equivalent brings us back to the entanglement with larger social and economic configurations I mentioned above. While I do not believe that there is necessarily a fatal connection between machine learning and advanced capitalism, it is hard to ignore how perfectly the interested readings these techniques perform fit into a system that attempts to extract monetary value from the exploitation of increasingly infinitesimal differences. A general theory of algorithmic techniques will have to accept that the objective and objectal dimensions, to use Simondon's terms again, cannot be held separate indefinitely.
Fourth, a lack of engagement with concrete technological procedures further cements the cultural and epistemological rift between humanists and engineers. There is a vast gap between the well-meant appeals by Pariser (2011) , asking companies and engineers to design algorithms that favor 'diversity' and 'serendipity' instead of enclosing us in filter bubbles that narrow our horizon, and the concepts, languages, and techniques that guide actual implementations. This gap needs to be bridged in a more fundamental way than the superficial and increasingly managerial notion of interdisciplinarity allows, if we want to make information filtering a political issue in more precise terms. If 'diversity' and 'serendipity' are not to mean randomness, we will have to think about the concrete meaning we want to give to these terms, and this meaning will have to find a way of expressing itself in the medium of computation. This is not simply a translation from one discipline into another, for example, from political science into computer science, but a much more complicated process that requires a painstaking production of a precarious association between fundamentally different forms of expression. While I agree with Mackenzie (2015, p. 436 ) that it is not essential to have a detailed grasp of how data mining methods work, I believe that an understanding on the more general level of algorithmic techniques is both attainable and necessary. My technical presentation of the Bayes classifier certainly omitted many aspects that any computer or information scientist would consider to be essential. My goal, however, was to find a level of description where an encounter between technical and larger cultural principles becomes possible, a level where neither 'side' is reduced to a caricature. We can certainly envision a broad critique of a particular style of data mining, for example, the probabilistic style. But when we understand that 'probabilistic', here, means that each property of a formalized entity is framed as an indicator for membership in a set of predefined classes, our critique will maybe be able to produce actual suggestions. Could we show users which properties contributed most to a decision? Could we make property or value selection available on the interface? Could we make training principles explicit? Could we make probabilistic associations fade over time? Could we define exceptions? These suggestions are mere stumps, but they can maybe illustrate how a deeper yet still pre-formal understanding of algorithmic techniques in the humanities and social sciences could lead to the emergence of a trading zone where the false opposition between culture and technology (Simondon, 1958, p. 9 ) no longer applies.
Notes
1. There are considerable differences between types of 'software makers', but all of them employ algorithmic techniques in various ways. The information ordering techniques this paper focuses on result from intensive research activity in academic computer and information science, but they are now readily available to most developers through software libraries and extensive documentation. 2. I use this term in loose reference to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier's notion of datafication:
'data refers to a description of something that allows it to be recorded, analyzed, and
